The surge in capital inflows towards emerging countries after 2009 has revived the debate about capital controls. This paper analyzes some of the international implications of restrictions on capital inflows. Focusing on a sample of Latin-American countries, we use detailed balance of payments data and higher frequency data on portfolio bond and equity flows to investigate the potential spillover effects that capital controls imposed in one country may have on neighboring economies. Using various econometric approaches, we find that a rise in the Brazilian tax on portfolio bond inflows has been affecting other Latin-American economies through significant surges in portfolio funds invested either in fixed income or equity securities. The effect is usually short lasting and followed by rapid reductions in those inflows, particularly bonds. Yet it can be large. According to our estimates, the increase in the Brazilian tax on portfolio bond inflows may account for all the surge in bond inflows to Mexico between September and October 2010. JEL Classification Codes: F32, F33, F42.
Introduction
The surge in capital inflows towards emerging countries after 2009 has revived the debate about capital controls. There are two key issues: (i) are capital controls effective at reducing the volatility of international capital flows, e.g. by decreasing the volume of inflows or preventing sudden capital outflows? and (ii) what are the effects of such controls on other countries? The second question lied at the core of the discussions that led to the adoption of "coherent conclusions for the management of capital flows" by G20 Leaders in November 2011. 1 As a matter of fact, if the introduction of capital controls in one country has positive or negative spillover effects on other countries, there is a strong motivation for multilateral cooperation to maximize global welfare.
Capital controls can be defined as measures aimed at restricting international capital mobility that discriminate between residents and non-residents. This definition does not distinguish between controls on outflows and controls on inflows, nor does it reflect the variety of possible measures from market-based restrictions or price controls to quantitative controls. The focus of this paper will be on price controls on capital inflows.
There are two main reasons why countries may impose controls on capital inflows.
First, capital controls may be motivated by prudential considerations (Korinek, 2011 ).
Countries may want to limit capital inflows to prevent the build-up of asset price bubbles and excessive external indebtedness. As shown by Korinek (2010) , the risks posed by capital inflows stem from the existence of a pecuniary externality that results in distortions of the financing and investment decisions of private market participants. Small private agents take prices, especially exchange rates, as given, and neglect the price effects of their actions and the resulting balance sheets effects. In bad times, those effects may constrain the access of economic agents to external finance, which in turn forces them to cut back on their spending and contract aggregate demand following a financial amplification mechanism. Prudential capital controls can thus help to reduce the incentive for excess risk-taking on the part of private agents and the level of financial fragility in the economy.
Second, capital controls may be used for mercantilist reasons to prevent an appreciation of the exchange rate while keeping the autonomy of monetary policy.
The existing literature provides mixed evidence of the effectiveness of controls to affect inflows. Along with the various approaches and methodologies used, this diversity of results owes to the different degree of enforceability of policies within country-specific 1 G20 Leaders Summit, Final Communiqué, Cannes, November 2011. contexts. Empirical studies suggest that capital controls have been more successful at restoring the autonomy of monetary policy or at altering the composition of external liabilities (particularly in terms of maturity) than at reducing the volume of flows entering a given country. When the latter objective is reached, the effect tends to be short-lived.
In turn, there is few evidence that capital controls succeed at alleviating exchange rate pressures. 2 Yet, most empirical work solely focuses on the effects on the very country that had set those policies. Very few studies look at the international spillover effects of such controls.
Controls on capital inflows may have three types of spillover effects. First, the adoption of controls in one country may produce higher capital flow volatility in other countries with similar characteristics. If international capital flows are mainly driven by exogenous "push" factors, they will go where they are allowed to. Thus capital controls could in turn act as another "push" factor driving inflows in other countries. Second, capital controls that lead to persistently undervalued exchange rates, do produce externalities insofar as they affect the relative price-competitiveness of countries in international trade. Third, capital controls and restrictions to capital mobility may prevent an optimal international allocation of capital resulting in lower global economic growth. This paper attempts to assess the magnitude of the first effect. Using detailed balance of payments data and higher frequency data on portfolio flows for a large sample of emerging countries, we construct correlation matrices of inflows in emerging economies to identify groups of countries among which spillover effects from capital controls might be the largest. We show that cross-country correlations of inflows are stronger within the same regional area and increase in crisis times. Focusing on Latin-American countries, we look for significant divergences in the co-movements of inflows following the introduction of capital controls in some countries. For our econometric analysis, we rely on monthly data on portfolio investments in bonds and equities compiled by EPFR (Emerging Portfolio Fund Research) calibrated and fitted on balance of payments data. Using single equation regressions, we provide evidence of the extent to which the Brazilian tax on portfolio inflows or IOF may have contributed to divert capital flows to other Latin American economies. Those spillover effects are significant. Using impulse response functions from VARs, we estimate that the increase in the Brazilian tax on portfolio bond inflows from 2 to 6% in October 2010 led to additional bond inflows to Mexico of about USD 1.8bn in the same month. This figure is consistent with monthly data on bond inflows to Mexico, which increased from USD 3.7bn in September 2010 to USD 5.1bn in October (EPFR data calibrated and fitted on balance of payments flows), while at the same time bond inflows to Brazil dropped from USD 4.2bn to 2.2bn. Thus, according to our estimation, in the absence of any change in the Brazilian tax on inflows, the inflows to Mexico would have slightly decreased.
Our results are confirmed by other recent work. Using a different dataset from the same provider Forbes, Fratzscher, Kostka and Straub (2012) also find some evidence of positive international spillovers from Brazilian capital controls. In their paper, a strengthening of the Brazilian IOF has two opposite effects: on the one hand, it leads to a reduction in the share of portfolio funds invested in Brazil and in other countries that also have (traditionally or recently) set restrictions on their capital account; on the other hand, it leads to an increase in the proportion of portfolio funds invested in open countries sharing some common feature with Brazil: countries in the same region (Latin America), other large emerging economies, and large exporters to China. Yet there are two main methodological differences between their work and ours. First, Forbes et al. (2012) use EPFR data alone while we also rely on balance of payments statistics to address potential selection biases (as the coverage of the EPFR database is quite limited); this also enables us to quantify overall spillover effects as a ratio of each country's inflows to GDP, rather than as a share of mutual funds' portfolio allocated to each country. Second, we deal with potential endogeneity bias through instrumental variables in single equation regressions, completed by a VAR analysis, whereas the issue is acknowledged but not addressed in Forbes et al. (2012) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on international capital flows and provides anecdotal evidence of international spillover effects from Brazil's tightening of capital controls. The econometric analysis is the focus of Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Stylized facts on international capital flows

EPFR and balance of payments data
In most emerging economies (Brazil is an exception), balance of payments data on portfolio liabilities, with a breakdown between debt and equity flows, are only available on a quarterly frequency. In addition, we therefore use data on portfolio investments in bonds and equities, compiled by EPFR. Our dataset is comprised of bond and equity country flows data at monthly frequency, over the periods April 2004-June 2011 for bond flows and February 1996-June 2011 for equity flows. To our knowledge, those data have been used by few papers so far (Bernanke, 2010; Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Tarun, 2010; Fratzscher, 2011; Forbes et al., 2012) .
EPFR collects data from investment funds, mostly based in the OECD, on their international transactions in bonds and equities. Accordingly, the reported flows are part of the portfolio investments carried out by non-residents in emerging countries recorded in those countries' balances of payments. Yet the comparison between EPFR and balance of payments data shows a significant discrepancy in coverage, as EPFR flows only account for some 15% of balance of payments flows. To match monthly EPFR data with quarterly balance of payments flows and limit biases related to measurement errors and limited coverage, we implement a calibrating and fitting procedure, similar to the one used to compute French quarterly national accounts (see Appendix A for details). While we do not provide an assessment of the drivers of this dynamics, we guess that "pull" factors, such as better growth outlook, higher interest rates, lower public and private debt in emerging countries, did play a role in this rebound. Using a factor model, Fratzscher (2011) emphasizes the role of idiosyncratic, country-specific shocks as a dominant determinant of capital flows, particularly for countries in Emerging Asia and Latin
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America. Yet "push" factors such as abundant global liquidity, resulting from extremely accommodative monetary policies in advanced economies, and increased uncertainty about growth prospects in those countries may also be playing a role. In that respect, it is illustrative that correlations of flows have increased between the pre-and post-crisis periods ( Figure 5 ).
The potential importance of "push" factors is a strong motivation to investigate the existence of possible spillover effects of capital controls. If capital flows are driven by global factors unrelated to domestic circumstances, one can imagine that restrictions to entry in a given country may lead to an increase in inflows to neighboring countries, as we have seen that flows seem very strongly correlated within the same region.
Anecdotal evidence of spillover effects of controls
Faced with volatile and short-term inflows, some emerging countries have been reacting by imposing controls on inflows. In Latin America, it has been especially the case of Brazil, which reinstated the IOF (Imposto sobre Operações Financeiras) in October 2009, at a 2% rate on portfolio inflows from non-residents (either equities or bonds). The tax rate was subsequently raised to 6% for bond inflows in October 2010 (see Appendix B). Other factors than a diverting effect of capital controls may however explain the diverging trends of non-resident capital inflows into bonds, in Mexico and in Brazil. On the one hand, Mexico was the first emerging country to be included in Citigroup Inc.'s World Government Bond Index, on October 1st, 2010, which may have boosted fixed-income investment into the country. On the other hand, the decrease in bond inflows to Brazil may be partly explained by circumventing strategies: shortly after the IOF reinforcement in October 2010, foreign direct investment into Brazil increased significantly, especially through intercompany loans. 4 As noted by Carvalho and Garcia (2006) , such a strategy had already been used in the past to avoid the IOF tax. Moreover, subsequent measures adopted by the Brazilian authorities, taxing foreign exchange derivatives transactions, may indicate that investors had been pursuing carry-trade strategies through the forward exchange rate market rather than through the Brazilian bond market. Hence the need for a more thorough and systematic analysis.
Econometric evidence
We investigate if a tightening of controls in Brazil has been diverting short term flows to third economies in Latin America. We look at the largest recipient countries of capital flows in the region other than Brazil: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. We use first a static econometric approach (time series and panel estimations, in which the lagged dependent variable is not included as a regressor) then we introduce some dynamics by estimating a vector autoregressive model (VAR) and we simulate impulse-response functions country by country.
Data and variables
We use monthly EPFR data on portfolio flows calibrated and fitted on quarterly balance of payments data. The sample period (2004m4-2011m6) was determined by the availability of EPFR series for both bond and equity funds. To get comparable estimators, we relate bond and equity inflows to domestic GDP (Bd r, Eq r ). Quarterly GDP data have been seasonally adjusted using the census X11 (Historical) method, and then converted into monthly series by linear interpolation. Data on the remaining variables come from the IMF International Financial Statistics and from national sources.
We focus on the effect of recent Brazilian capital controls on portfolio inflows to Brazil and to third Latin American countries. The static specifications are estimated for three dependent variables in the case of Brazil: the ratios of gross inflows of portfolio bonds (Bra Bd r ), of portfolio equity (Bra Eq r ) and of intercompany loans (Bra ICL r ). For third countries, estimations are carried out on two dependent variables: the ratios of gross inflows of portfolio bonds ( Bd r ) and of portfolio equity ( Eq r ).
As for the regressors, our main explanatory variable is the prevailing value at the end of the month of the IOF on bonds (IOF Bd ). The IOF on bonds is an ad valorem tax on purchases of Brazilian fixed income securities by non-residents, which has been ranging from 0% to 6% since March 2008 (see Appendix B). Hereafter we refer to this tax simply as "IOF".
The other explanatory (control) variables correspond to "push" and "pull" factors commonly highlighted in the literature on capital flows. Domestic growth is proxied by the (seasonally adjusted) monthly growth rate of the industrial production index (InProd v ).
We compute a tax equivalent measure of capital controls ( TaxEquiv ) for third countries that have implemented required reserves on some categories of external financing (see Appendix C). This proxy for capital controls varies over time for Colombia and Peru and is equal to zero for the other countries. As a proxy for the world interest rate (WIR), we calculated an average of the money market rates in the main reserve currencies areas (U.S.A., the Eurozone, Japan, the United Kingdom and Switzerland), weighted by their respective GDP in 2010. As a measure for domestic interest rates (IR), we use nominal interbank money market rates. 5 Besides, we construct a measure of "pure" expected depreciation (EER v ), aimed at avoiding colinearity with other explanatory variables. The variable EER v captures future expected exchange rate variations in a given country, once the effect of domestic and foreign interest rates is removed from the observed three-month forward exchange rates. 6 Combined, the latter three variables capture the excess return that a foreign investor can get by investing in domestic riskless assets, corrected by the expected exchange rate depreciation (IR -EER v -WIR). Finally, using the cyclical component of the volatility index VIX 7 , we construct a dummy variable (VIX extreme) aimed at capturing periods of extreme uncertainty, during which a widespread retrenchment of financial flows may occur. The variable VIX extreme is equal to one when the absolute value of the HP-detrended VIX is larger than two times its standard deviation, and zero otherwise.
Other variables are tested in alternative specifications (see below). As long as they reflect fears of excessive currency appreciation, they may be used as instruments for the Brazilian IOF Bd. Purchases of foreign currency by Brazilian authorities are proxied by the changes in the ratio of official reserve assets to GDP (IRes r ). 8 The realized appreciation rate is calculated as the percentage variation of the spot exchange rate (SER v ).
The domestic inflation rate (INF ) is computed as the percentage monthly variation of the Consumer Price Index, on a year-on-year basis. We also checked the suitability of the IOF on equity (IOF Eq) either as an additional control or else as an instrument. IOF Eq may be assimilated to a "dummy" exogenous variable since it shows almost no variability: it was raised from 0% to 2% around October 2009, and has remained at this level since then.
Some descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 1 .
5 For the sake of homogeneity across countries we chose interbank rates of very short maturities rather than three-month rates.
6 Using the usual notations, the covered interest rate parity condition yields 1
practice, a measure of expected depreciation such as (f − s)/s is strongly correlated with both i and i * . To avoid colinearity problems, we use as a proxy for the "pure" expected depreciation EER v the residualsε of the following OLS regression (with no constant): (f − s)/s = αi + βi * + ε 7 The trend was obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott filter and subtracted from the series to obtain the cyclical component of the VIX.
8 However the quality of such a proxy is biased by the keenness of the Brazilian central bank to intervene through foreign exchange swap contracts.
Static analysis
We estimate four types of equation, each one explaining a different variable: portfolio bond or equity inflows, to Brazil or to third countries. Our baseline regression is carried out using ordinary least squares (OLS), and subsequent estimations include fixed effects (FE) or instrumental variables. For our dependent variables, gross inflows/GDP, all the series are stationary according to augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests at least at 95% confidence levels. As for our explanatory variables, with very rare exceptions, series are found to have a unit root. We therefore use the ratio of flows to GDP as such and all the regressors in first differences (denoted by d(.)) or in percentage variations (denoted by v ). 9 As an additional test, each regression is also estimated by OLS with the dependent variable in first differences. Finally, along with portfolio bond and equity inflows towards
Brazil we estimate the effect of the IOF on intercompany loans from foreign corporations to Brazilian affiliates (measured as a ratio to GDP). A positive reaction of the latter to the IOF might reflect some by-passing of Brazilian capital controls by foreign investors.
In our baseline specification, we use contemporaneous and lagged values (up to four lags) of d(IOF Bd ), which is the focus of our analysis. This variable is not autocorrelated, so we can include in the same regression different lags of d(IOF Bd ). The rest of the explanatory variables are included in a contemporaneous way.
Taking for instance bond inflows as the dependent variable, the time series specification for Brazil takes the form:
where X 1 , ..., X K is a set of K control variables and ε t are supposed to be zero mean and constant variance errors. The specification for bonds includes an AR(1) term, whereas AR(1), AR(2) terms are added for equity and intercompany loans.
For third countries, the estimations are carried out in panel to check for the homogeneity of the responses of inflows to a change in the IOF. The pooled specification can be written as:
where X 1 , ..., X J are control variables common to all countries, X J+1,i , ..., X K,i are country specific control variables, and ε i,t are assumed to be zero mean and constant variance errors. All the specifications in panel include AR(1) and AR (2) terms.
By contrast with the pooled equation, in the FE specification, the constant c i is allowed to vary across individuals. This aims at capturing structural country-specific effects that could have remained undetected in the pooled regression, i.e. embedded in the error term.
Both equations (1) and (2) The main results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 . Measured by the adjusted R 2 , the fit of the regressions varies noticeably across specifications. Durbin-Watson statistics are all close to 2, which suggests that the autocorrelation of errors is corrected by the inclusion of AR terms. 11 Therefore, there is no risk of spurious regressions.
In the case of Brazil (Table 2) , the OLS regression with the dependent variable in level yields no clear cut conclusions about the effectiveness of controls. A tightening of the IOF significantly reduces the inward flow of portfolio bonds only with one month lag. Moreover, between two and three months after a given tightening of IOF Bd, Brazil seems to experience a significant increase in bond inflows. The latter effect is robust to TSLS estimation.
On the one hand, this counterintuitive result would be in line with the rationale advanced by Cordella (2003) : foreign investors are likely to prefer countries imposing capital controls, as long as the recipient economy is expected to reduce its external vulnerability. On the other hand, this increase appears to be contemporaneous to a surge in bond inflows to other Latin America countries (see Table 3 ). Hence, the significant surge in portfolio bond inflows between two and three months after a tightening of the IOF might be due to some type of rebalancing strategy of portfolio funds, missed by our control variables. 12
Turning to short-term effects, the negative impact of IOF on bond inflows to Brazil found in t + 1 is not robust to the TSLS estimation. Yet we cannot reject that d(IOF Bd ) t is exogenous in this specification. As endogeneity bias is ruled out and OLS estimators are more efficient than TSLS, we trust the initial result: the IOF is negatively related to the level of bond inflows to Brazil (relative to GDP) in t + 1. The results with the dependent 11 Since AR terms are added to account for the serial autocorrelation of errors, the DW statistic is computed from the estimated one-period ahead forecast errors, rather than from the unconditional residuals.
The DW statistic remains a valid indicator as long as the specification does not include lagged values of the dependent variable on the right hand side. 12 For the whole sample, the fit of the regression on the level of bond inflows (in GDP %) to Brazil is quite poor. This is mainly due to the fact that portfolio bond inflows to Brazil were quite volatile until Table 2 is positive and significant. The four-month lag suggests that these strategies take some time to be implemented. The Brazilian authorities eventually adressed this loophole in August 2011.
As for the control variables, the coefficients on the return differential corrected by depreciation are not statistically different from zero. Indeed expected returns may be more relevant for investors to discriminate among countries at any given point in time, than to determine the pattern of capital flows to a given country over time. 14 In turn, the proxies for growth and for extreme uncertainty do significantly affect portfolio inflows towards 13 Part of the strong effect we find may also be related to Petrobras' large equity issue in September 2010, since some of the corresponding equity flows may have been reported in October, at a time when the IOF was being reinforced. 14 This is especially the case for Brazil, where interest rates have been on a decreasing trend over the past ten years (due to stabilization policies), without this implying a fall in capital inflows.
Brazil, especially in the case of bond inflows. Still, the exclusion of those controls, while worsening the fit of the regressions, does not change our results.
Next, we investigate the existence of potential spillovers of the Brazilian tax on portfolio bond inflows towards the five Latin American economies mentioned above (Table 3 ). The baseline specification for third countries presents almost no difference with respect to that used for Brazil. We simply add one more regressor: the variable d( TaxEquiv ) controls for the relative cost for a foreign investor of holding external liabilities issued by Colombia and Peru.
By contrast to Brazil, equity inflows towards third countries seem to be better explained by return differences 15 than by uncertainty periods. In turn, only bond inflows are positively related to growth. The OLS regression points to significant coincident common responses of inflows to third countries following a tightening of capital controls in
Brazil. Following an increase in the IOF for bonds in Brazil, third countries experience significant surges in portfolio bond inflows and, to a lesser extent, equity inflows. Yet, this diverting effect from the IOF on bond inflows to third countries seems to vanish after one month. 16 Regressing the dependent variable in first difference tends to confirm that the surge in the level of inflows in period t is short-lived: indeed we find a significant slowdown in the growth of incoming portfolio flows, of both bonds and equity, in period t+1. The spillover effects found in the pooled estimations are also robust when controlling for country fixed effects (FE).
The above OLS and FE results might again be driven by simultaneity bias: Brazilian authorities could have tightened controls as they observe increases in inflows towards other Latin America economies. We therefore apply for third countries the same instrumental variables strategy (TSLS) as for inflows to Brazil. The spillover effects on portfolio bonds flowing to third countries appear to be more important and long-lasting than those estimated by OLS. Yet, while d(IOF Bd ) t appears to be endogenous, we could not find a set of suitable instruments. Even as we instrumented solely by SER v t−1 , the p-value of the 15 The negative sign suggests that equity flows increase as the expected yield of alternative portfolio (bond) investments decrease. 16 As noted above, the significant surge in flows to third countries three months after a given tightening in Brazilian capital controls (see table 3 ) also characterizes the evolution of bond inflows to Brazil (table   2) . Thus, rather than the direct impact of the IOF on bonds, an omitted determinant of the investment funds' behavior could drive such a lagged effect. The VAR analysis sheds some light on the duration of the IOF's effects over time.
J-statistic did not allow to reject that E(Zε i,t ) = 0. For bond inflows to third countries, OLS results are thus preferred to TSLS. Namely, we accept that spillovers are significant but tend to last on average no more than one period. As regards equity inflows, the spillover effect is not robust to the TSLS estimation. In this case the test confirming the exogeneity of d(IOF Bd ) t is backed by the validity of the instruments. The OLS and FE estimators are thus preferred to TSLS results. We can therefore accept the existence of some diverted equity flows to third countries, which are again very short-lived.
Last, we analyze whether some common pattern can be inferred from the identified spillovers. Along with the baseline specification, we estimate by pooled OLS an alternative model including no lag for the IOF (since spillovers appear to be significant only at t) and some terms of interaction of d(IOF Bd ) t with the country-specific controls. Thereby, we aim at checking which factors can potentially drive the flows to a given third economy once they are diverted from Brazil. We find that neither the returns spread nor industrial production growth play a significant role. Instead, ceteris paribus the more a given third country has tightened capital controls in the previous period, the less diverted bond flows it receives in average as Brazil's IOF is raised.
Dynamic specification
To investigate potential spillovers on a country basis, we estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model for each country. This type of specification accounts for contemporaneous and lagged feedback effects among variables, all of which can be treated as endogenous.
Not only potential endogeneity bias are ruled out but the VAR seems also a good approach as capital flows respond to a given shock at different lags, depending on their determinants and on the characteristics of the recipient country. We can therefore study how potential spillovers evolve over time taking into account the dynamic path of all the variables. The reduced autoregressive (AR) form of an open VAR can be written as follows:
where 17 Y t is a vector of m endogenous variables, A * p (L) is an invertible matrix containing the m×m coefficients a 
where
As long as the perturbations e t are stationary, the systems (3) and (4) We exploit the dynamic properties of the estimated VAR through the simulation of impulse-response functions. This cannot be done directly from (3) though. A structural VAR model (SVAR) is needed to get economically interpretable impulse-responses. 18 The SVAR is assumed to summarize the underlying "true" structure of the modeled economic relationships. The following structural representation takes into account the potential contemporaneous relationships between endogenous variables through a matrix M.
In (5), u t is a vector of m structural perturbations and Σ u is its associated variancecovariance matrix. M is assumed to be an invertible m × m matrix and the dimensions of the other matrices and vectors are the same as in (3). The relationship between a 18 See Amisano and Giannini (1997) and Gottschalk (2001) for a more complete discussion on the SVAR models.
structural model (5) and its reduced form (3) is given by M as follows:
e t = M −1 u t (8)
The impulse-response functions are computed from the MA structural form of the SVAR. From (4) and (6-9) we can write:
where C p (L) = C * p (L)M −1 and u t = Me t . A SVAR implies that the structural perturbations of the model u t are not mutually correlated, unlike the reduced form errors e t obtained above. The elements of u t represent unexpected 'primitive' innovations, with no common causes. The impulse-response functions (i.e. the coefficients of C p (L)) have then an economic interpretation since the effect of a shock to u t is computed anything else in Y t being equal (i.e. as a lagged serie of partial derivatives). As long as innovations u t are orthogonal, the associated variances and covariances Σ u form a diagonal matrix. In our baseline identification scheme, we impose simple exclusion restrictions: we assume that M −1 is a m × m lower triangular matrix. 19 A coefficient a j k = 0 on the k th row, j th column of M −1 implies a recursive order in the contemporaneous causality: at time t an unexpected shock on the variable y j (i.e. u j ) leaves unchanged the observed variation of y k (or equivalently the forecast error e k ).
For third countries in our sample (for example, Mexico), M −1 multiplies the vector of structural shocks to endogenous variables in the following order:
, u InProd v , u Mex Eq r , u Mex Bd r ). By assuming a lower triangular matrix M −1 , we actually specify which variables are considered "external" or "weakly endogenous", so that they cannot be contemporaneously affected by shocks on other variables.
We ordered the variables of a given country VAR model following economic reasoning, with our dependent variables (portfolio inflows) always in the last position (i.e. as the "most endogenous" variables). In general, "push" variables appear before "pull" ones. We consider that the interest rate spread may have a contemporaneous effect on industrial growth in a given country, but the latter cannot affect the interest rate differential in the same period. As for the ordering between d(IOF Bd), Mex Eq r and Mex Bd r, the above TSLS estimations showed that it is hard to disentangle the sense of causality between the IOF and portfolio inflows. Yet, we consider that global investment funds can react to changes in capital account regulations in a given country faster than the country's authorities can respond to changes in incoming capital flows. First, local authorities face lags when collecting and processing information on capital flows; second, changes in the rules take time to be implemented. Thus, we assume that Brazilian capital controls on bonds may explain (but not be explained by) flows to third countries (Mex Bd r ) within the current period (a month length). Similarly, for third countries where capital controls have been set (Colombia and Peru) the tax equivalents for required reserves d(Col TaxEquiv ) and d(Per TaxEquiv ) are ordered just before the inflows. As for the order of flows, we assume that equity inflows to a given country (Mex Eq r ) are more stable than portfolio bond inflows (Mex Bd r ), which are more volatile (see Table 1 ) and thus supposed to be affected by all the precedent variables. The VAR for Brazil was specified following the same order, except that d(IOF Bd ) is a less "exogenous" variable than in third countries: it follows InProd v and precedes Bra Eq r. As in third countries, we suppose that capital inflows are quite reactive to the IOF, so that portfolio decisions by fund managers can be modified within a month. By contrast, Brazilian authorities react at least with one month lag after having observed a surge in inflows.
Our impulse responses are computed supposing that the magnitude of a shock on u jt corresponds to the root of the Σ u diagonal elements (i.e. to one standard deviation σ uj ). Figure 8 focuses on the responses of portfolio bond and equity flows to a one standard deviation shock to the IOF (equivalent to a 53 basis points increase in the tax). 20 As 20 Although we are mainly interested in potential diversion of capital inflows, we also simulated the re-noted by Hamilton (1994) , the fact that the confidence intervals tend to be quite wide is a common feature of the simulation of VAR impulse responses. Related works often display 68% confidence intervals. In our work, the confidence threshold is more stringent. Figure   8 shows ±2 standard deviation intervals, i.e. a 95% confidence level. Still, one way to increase the statistical significance of the responses would be to impose more restrictions on the SVAR. In our baseline model, we chose to impose only the exclusion restrictions summarized in the triangular matrix M −1 , since they already imply strong assumptions on the contemporaneous causality of the variables.
Most results yielded by the VAR are consistent with those found in the static approach.
The VAR impulse-response functions shed some light on the timing of effects, while determining which countries of the sample are more likely to receive diverted flows after a rise in the IOF. Since variables are stationary, the response to an innovation reverts back to the equilibrium level in the subsequent periods.
For Chile, Mexico and Peru we find significant evidence of a boost in bond inflows immediately after a tightening of the IOF. In particular, we estimate that the increase in the Brazilian tax on portfolio bond inflows from 2 to 6% in October 2010 may have triggered additional bond inflows to Mexico of about USD 1.8bn in the same month. 21
Other countries also experience a surge in inflows, although the statistical significance is lower, especially after one month. Surges tend therefore to be short-lived and are often followed by inflows temporarily below the stationary level.
The response of equity inflows to a positive innovation in IOF Bd is strong and significantly positive in Brazil and Colombia and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico. The effect on portfolio equity flows is also short-lasting and generally vanishes two months after the tightening in capital controls. These results are consistent with previous findings reported by Ostry et al. (2010) and Magud et al. (2011) : as long as market participants quickly sponse of nominal exchange rates to capital controls. We found significant evidence of currency appreciation only in Argentina, following the implementation of the IOF in Brazil. Still, spillover effects on exchange rates are difficult to show since many variables other than portfolio inflows influence exchange rates. A study focused on exchange rates should also control for the whole set of net operations denominated in foreign currency, including sterilization by central banks. We leave that for future research.
21 From VAR estimations, we infer that a one-standard-deviation (0.532%) rise in the IOF tax variable (in differences) leads to a 0.278% increase in the ratio of portfolio bond inflows to GDP in Mexico. The
October 2010 hike of the IOF tax (from 2% to 6%) would therefore have caused additional bond inflows to Mexico of about 2.03% of (monthly) GDP, that is (with monthly Mexican GDP at USD 87bn) of roughly USD 1.8bn.
adapt and exploit loopholes, the effectiveness of capital controls tends to be only temporary. Therefore, the spillovers that we found on neighboring countries are in turn likely to be short lived.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed how portfolio inflows, both towards Brazil and towards other large Latin American countries, have responded to capital controls recently set by the Brazilian authorities. We focused on the impact of the IOF for bonds, which has been the instrument most actively used to tax portfolio financial inflows to Brazil. We found some evidence that bond inflows to Brazil tend to slow down as capital controls on fixed income securities are tightened. We found much stronger econometric evidence that a tightening of the tax on bonds has encouraged equity inflows to Brazil and some type of inward FDI such as inter-company loans, probably aimed at circumventing capital controls.
The main contribution of this paper concerns the potential international spillovers of such measures. Unlike previous studies, usually restrained to the effects on the country that tightens the access of foreign financial flows itself, we enlarged the analysis to the effect of capital controls on third countries in the region. Besides, the high frequency of our data on portfolio inflows (monthly) enables the identification of effects that could have gone unnoticed otherwise. We found significant evidence of spillovers arising from Brazilian controls on bond inflows. Our panel and VAR estimations showed that bond inflows and, to a lesser extent, equity inflows to most of the economies of our sample (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) are positively related to a rise in the IOF in Brazil. As for the pattern followed by funds diverted to large Latin America economies, we found no evidence that they have been reoriented to those countries with higher (industrial production) growth or wider returns differentials. Instead, it appears that the more a country has been imposing capital controls, the less likely it is receiving portfolio bond inflows diverted by Brazil's IOF. This suggests that investors prefer financially open economies to reallocate their portfolios. The surge in inflows tends to be short lived, but the evidence of such an externality deserves to be highlighted, because of the potential effects on domestic macroeconomic and prudential policies pursued by neighboring countries.
A Calibrating and fitting method
While EPFR data are available at a high frequency, they suffer from various biases, as well as insufficient coverage. On the contrary, balance of payment data are exhaustive and computed according to a standardized methodology. For many countries they are however available only at a quarterly frequency, which may undermine the robustness of certain econometric estimations (Habermeier, Kokenyne and Baba, 2011) . We therefore use a method to adjust the high frequency EPFR data and ensure their consistency with quarterly balance-of-payments data. This method, called calibrating and fitting, is being used extensively to produce French quarterly national accounts.
Let BOP q be quarterly balance-of-payment flows (either bond or equity flows), and EPFR m denote the corresponding monthly EPFR data. Then EPFR q is defined as the sum of monthly flows over a quarter: For each quarter q,
We assume that although EPFR data suffer from various biases, they have a quarterly profile similar to that of BOP data (a reasonable assumption, confirmed by the visual observation of the time series' plots or by regression results, especially R 2 statistics).
Then we estimate the following econometric relationship (on a quarterly basis):
This is the calibration part of the exercise. From (A-2) we deriveα andβ through an OLS regression. Quarterly residuals are denoted byε q . We then calculate monthly residuals (fitting step) through optimization techniques, so that these monthly residuals be as smooth as possible, and not distort the overall series profile. The optimization program to calculate (ε m ) is defined as follows:
subject to the constraints: mε m =ε q Finally, we assume that (A-2), which was estimated at a quarterly frequency, holds on a monthly basis as well. We can then compute monthly series, denoted by (BOP m ), as:
From (A-4), it is easy to check that (BOP m ) has the two required properties: 
Sep 08
The IOF is removed.
Oct 09 Reinstatement of 2% IOF on bond and equity flows from non residents.
Nov 09 1.5% ad valorem tax on the conversion of ADR (certificates of deposit issued by Brazilian corporations in the U.S.) into Brazilian stocks.
Oct 10 Increase to 6% of IOF on portfolio bonds and on the conversion of ADR.
Increase from 0.38% to 6% on deposits guaranteeing non-residents' investments on exchange rate futures.
30 Dec 10 IOF on the conversion of ADR into Brazilian stocks is reduced from 6% to 2%
(same level as tax on stock purchases by non-residents).
B.2 Peru
May 06 Introduction of a 30% URR marginal rate (over the 6% minimum URR) on foreign currency bank deposits and on external bank liabilities (URR to be held in the corresponding currency).
Sept 07
The marginal URR rate on long term external bank liabilities (essentially credit lines) is removed.
Apr 08
The marginal URR rate on domestic currency bank deposits held by nonresidents is raised (from 15% to 40%) further than that on residents (from 15% to 20%).
Jul 08
The marginal URR rate on domestic currency bank deposits held by nonresidents reaches 120% (25% for residents).
Oct 08
The marginal URR rate on short term external bank liabilities is removed.
Dec 08
The marginal URR rate on domestic currency bank deposits held by nonresidents is lowered to 35% (0% for residents).
Jul 10 Increase in the commission on the sale of Central Bank securities to nonresidents, from 0,01% in December 2009 to 4% in July 2010.
Jul-Sep 10 Limits on the investments of pension funds abroad are raised from 22% to 28% in July, then up to 30% in September (removing restrictions on capital outflows).
Feb-Oct 10 The marginal URR rate on short term external bank liabilities is reinstated at 35% then progressively raised to 75%.
Jul-Sep 10 The marginal URR rate on domestic currency bank deposits held by nonresidents is raised from 40% to 120% (from 0% to 15% for residents).
Feb 11 A Government bill intends to raise from 30% to 50% the limit on the investments of pension funds abroad (removing restrictions on capital outflows).
B.3 Colombia
May 07 Introduction of a 40% URR ratio (for a minimum period of 6 month deposit in domestic currency) mainly on portfolio debt inflows from non-residents. A 2 years minimum stay was required for an inflow to qualify as FDI.
May 08
The URR ratio on portfolio inflows is raised to 50%.
Oct 08
The URR ratio is removed.
C Computation of a tax equivalent to the reserve requirements A standard tax equivalent for required reserves (RR) on foreign liabilities is used e.g.
by Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998), De Gregorio et al. (2000) and Edwards and Rigobon (2009) . We compute this tax for the more general case in which required reserves can be remunerated. We follow the notation of De Gregorio et al. (2000) .
Suppose that, for each dollar of incoming funds, a percentage u is to be held as RR for a minimum period h and that (1 − u) is invested for k periods. The world interest rate is denoted by i * , the domestic yield is i k and the interest rate paid on RR (if remunerated)
is r. Assuming that k ≥ h and that the RR, once reimbursed, are reinvested outside the country that has set capital controls, the non-arbitrage condition states:
The tax equivalent for the RR, denoted by µ k , has to be such that i k = i * + µ k .
Applying the latter condition and the approximation (1 + x) a ≈ (1 + ax) one gets:
In calculating our proxy for the tax equivalent of the RR, we assume for simplicity that the investment period equals the minimum holding period. The tax equivalent for the RR used in our empirical analysis is then:
In our empirical analysis, r is nil for Colombia and 0.6*LIBOR for Peru. For i * we use the world interest rate (WIR). The series of u are constructed from the tables in Terrier, Valdés, Tovar, Chan-Lau, Fernández-Valdovinos, García-Escribano, Medeiros, Tang, Vera Martin and Walker (2011) and Rincon and Toro (2010) for Colombia, and in Rossini, Quispez and Rodriguez (2011) for Peru. 
